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INTRODUCTION

Legal scholarship has lately witnessed a revival of interest in the
foundations of the common law. Some writers have sought to justify
the common law as a whole.' Others have advanced theories of one
* Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School.
1. Ronald Dworkin has been the chief evangelist, propounding a rights-based theory of
law and a corresponding obligation of judges to consider moral precepts when deciding
significant cases. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 1-130 (rev. ed.
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or another of the common law's subdivisions-torts, 2 for instance, or
contract. A theory of this latter type might seek, for example, to
explain why the common law includes contract as one of its parts; as
part of that effort it would also try to organize important cases and
doctrines of contract law into a coherent whole.
This article examines what is involved in developing a theory of
one of the common law's subdivisions and advances three claims.
First, a theorist begins with an intellectual picture or model of her
subject.3 To explain the law of contract--or torts, or whatever subdivision for which she hopes to account-the theorist must differentiate
contract from the rest of the common law. She must, in other words,
identify the features of contract that make it special and that need
explanation. She must also provide criteria for classifying particular
issues as belonging in contract or elsewhere in the common law. The
picture or model that guides the theorist in differentiating and classifying the doctrines and cases her theory might explain is what I call a
conception. Second, I argue that we can understand a theorist's
approach to her subject by identifying the conception (or conceptions)
on which she relies in developing her theory.4 How one might try to
rationalize the cases and doctrines of contract law will depend on how
one differentiates contract from the rest of the common law and how
one classifies legal controversies as belonging properly to contract law
or to some other part of the law. Finally, the theorist's conception
will imply criteria for evaluating the success of her theory.5 Lawyers
and scholars can judge, in terms of the theorist's conception, whether
she has explained the cases and doctrines that, according to her conception, ought to be explained by an adequate theory of contract.
My argument for these claims proceeds at two levels. First, at an
abstract and general level, I elaborate in Section II the idea of a theo1977). Dworkin's lead has been followed by others, preaching a variety of creeds. In law and
economics, for example, Richard Posner has argued that wealth maximization-what Posner
terms the "efficiency norm"-provides an ethical basis for the common law. See Posner, The
Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 487 (1980). Rejecting Posner's wealth maximization norm, Anthony Kronman has
advanced what he calls the Paretianist criterion, claiming that we may account for some
particular common law doctrine in terms of the long run benefit to those who are temporarily
disadvantaged by the doctrine's application. See Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive
Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle,9
J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980).
2. Jules Coleman has reviewed and analyzed a variety of theories that attempt to provide
a moral account of tort law. See Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits,
Parts I & II, I LAW & PHIL. 371 (1982); 2 id. at 5 (1983).
3. See infra text accompanying note 16.
4. See infra text accompanying note 17.
5. Id.

1987]

CONCEPTIONS OF CONTRACT

rist's conception and relate this idea to some basic principles of theory
formation and evaluation.6 I also explain in the same section why
recognizing the theorist's conception is especially significant for evaluating theories of one of the common law's subdivisions.
In the remainder of the article I demonstrate my claims in the
context of a detailed examination of Charles Fried's theory of contract,7 which for several reasons has received a great deal of scholarly
attention." Section III outlines Fried's view of contract law. He
maintains that contract is based on the moral obligation to keep one's
promises and that contract's doctrines reflect that obligation. 9 I argue
that Fried relies, at different points in his discussion, on three different
conceptions of contract law-the Simple, the Legal Process, and the
Teleological-each of which has been used by lawyers and scholars."0
Sections IV, V, and VI expound upon these three conceptions in turn
and show, by analyzing Fried's argument, the respective strengths
and weaknesses of each conception.II
While I discuss, in Section VII, some general criteria for an adequate theory of one of the common law's parts,I2 I do not attempt to
show that one conception is better than its rivals for explaining contract law. My aim in this article is to highlight the significance of the
writer's conception for theory building. Legal scholars have not generally sought to articulate or defend the conceptions they use, and this
failure hampers their efforts to develop theories of the common law's
various parts. Fried, for example, does not defend the conceptions on
which he relies.' 3 In fact, he employs each of these three conceptions
6. See infra text accompanying notes 14-22.
7. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE:

A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION

(1981).
8. See, e.g., J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION

TO JURISPRUDENCE 189-93, passim (1984); Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal & External,
78 Nw. U.L. REV. 340, 390-97 (1983); Kronman, A New Champion for the Will Theory, 91
YALE L.J. 404 (1981); Atiyah, Book Review, 95 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1981).

9. See infra text accompanying notes 23-33.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 35-41 (use of the Simple conception), notes 76-79
(use of the Legal Process conception) & notes 118-25 (use of the Teleological conception).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 34-74 (the Simple conception), notes 75-117 (the
Legal Process conception) & notes 118-58 (the Teleological conception).
12. See infra text accompanying note 160.
13. Fried does express concern about the extent to which his view of contract is challenged
by other, related principles of obligation. Thus, for example, he considers the extent to which
his view is compatible with a reliance principle, see C. FRIED, supra note 7, at 21-25, 54-56;
and with a restitutionary principle, id. at 21-25, 55, 115-18. His argument that promissory
liability can coexist with other sources of obligation therefore implies a position about the
boundaries of contract vis-a-vis the rest of the common law-namely, that contract, properly
so called, should be understood restrictively so as to avoid conflict with those other principles.
See, e.g., id. at 25. But he does not extend this discussion so as to articulate the range of
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in his argument without recognizing their important differences. I
contend that his failure to distinguish among the different conceptions
and their respective criteria for an adequate theory ultimately undermines his enterprise. We should expect comparable difficulties to
plague any theory of the subdivisions of common law that fails to
address these issues.
II.

THE IMPORTANCE OF A CONCEPTION

The effort to develop a theory that justifies one part of the common law implicates questions about the nature and adequacy of a
legal theory, similar to questions of theory formation and evaluation
in the philosophy of science. A theory is ordinarily advanced to
organize the relevant phenomena, so as to illuminate aspects of the
14
subject matter that would otherwise be obscure or problematic.
But, a theorist's hypotheses hardly emerge ex nihilo. She begins,
rather, from a pretheoretical conception of her subject.15 This intellectual model guides the theorist in formulating her initial hypotheses
about how best to explain or justify her topic. It also delimits, either
directly or implicitly, the range of the phenomena to be explained by
the theory.
The theorist's conception of her subject matter plays an imporphenomena that, on his view, an adequate theory of contract should explain. His position on
this latter question must be extracted from his various analyses. See infra text accompanying
notes 42-53, 84-90 & 126-42.
14. "What is it to supply a theory? It is to offer an intelligible, systematic, conceptual
pattern for the observed data. The value of this pattern lies in its capacity to unite phenomena
which, without the theory, are either surprising, anamolous, or wholly unnoticed." N.
HANSON, PATTERNS OF DISCOVERY 121 (1958). Legal scholars have not commonly thought
of their analyses as directed towards the production of a theory; perhaps as a result they have
not often tried to use the contributions of philosophy of science to illuminate their legal
research. There are a few notable exceptions. See, e.g., Hart, Definition and Theory in
Jurisprudence,70 LAW Q. REV. 37 (1954); Schauer, An Essay on ConstitutionalLanguage, 29
UCLA L. REV. 797, 814-28 (1982); Wellman, PracticalReasoning and JudicialJustification:
Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 45 (1985).
15. The issues that this article discusses in terms of the theorist's conception of her subject
matter are more commonly examined in the literature of philosophy of science in terms of the
epistemic or cognitive significance of the theorist's model. For a classic discussion of the
importance of a model for theory formation, see E. NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE:
PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 106-17 (1961). The most provocative

discussions of the significance of the theorist's conception are to be found in the claims of
writers who suggest that the resulting theory is, in some important way, fixed by the
pretheoretical conception. For example, Norwood Hanson has suggested that when two
theorists work from different conceptions, they are not even observing the same phenomena.
See N. HANSON, supra note 14, at 4-19. Similarly, in commenting on the importance of what
he calls the theorist's "paradigm," Thomas Kuhn sometimes seems to be claiming that theories
that result from different paradigms are fundamentally incommensurable. See T. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 111-35 (2d ed. 1970).
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tant role in the development of her theory. Her conception provides
criteria for classifying the observable phenomena into different categories and differentiating her subject from all other phenomena. The
contract theorist will therefore depend on her conception of contract
to differentiate from the welter of law those cases and doctrines that
are the data to be explained by her theory. 16 Her conception will also
indicate the features of contract that distinguish it from the rest of the
common law and that require their own special explanation or
justification.
The theorist's conception is also an important focus for the
responses of others to the proffered theory. Lawyers and scholars can
gain insight into the theorist's approach to her subject by identifying
her conception. A theorist begins with some conception or other of
her subject matter, but no one conception is determined by the data.
Rather, there may be a variety of possible conceptions that a theorist
might use in developing her account.17 The particular conception (or
conceptions) that a given writer employs will shape the set of cases
and doctrines that the theory aims to justify. Therefore, recognizing
the theorist's conception as a starting point for the development of her
theory can help us understand why the theory has the structure that it
has. Moreover, the theorist's conception will imply criteria for evaluating her theory. Because the theorist's conception identifies those elements of law that her theory ought to explain, we can assess whether
the resulting theory has, in fact, explained adequately the cases and
doctrines that, on the theorist's own conception of her subject, ought
to be explained. In other words, we can determine if the theory meets
the theorist's ambitions.
At some level of generality, my points about the significance of a
conception of the common law should be unsurprising. Any account,
whether of law or some other enterprise, will proceed from a pretheoretical characterization of the phenomena to be explained. Moreover, our evaluations of the resulting theory's adequacy may depend,
in various ways, on just how the theorist has characterized the phenomena. 18 Among other things, her pretheoretical characterizations
16. I take it for granted in this article that the data of a legal theory of some aspect of the
common law will necessarily include some of what we traditionally regard as law, i.e., cases,
rules, principles, trends, and the like.
17. Philosophers of science elaborate on this idea by pointing to the underdeterminationof
a theory with respect to its data. For a discussion of the concept of underdetermination in
natural science, see C. GLYMOUR, THEORY AND EVIDENCE 30-31 (1980). For applications of
the concept to topics in legal theory, see Schauer, supra note 14; Wellman, supra note 14, at 61-

62.
18. Cf, e.g., E. NAGEL, supra note 15, at 115.
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and discriminations of the data may have obscured significant regularities in the phenomena. Or, her characterization may have led the
theorist to overlook crucial distinctions. Finally, any theory should
be liable to challenge if some important issues were surreptitiously
resolved when the theorist stipulated the range of phenomena to be
explained. Thus, any theory's power and appeal may in several
respects depend on how the theorist conceives of the phenomena, and
we gain insight into the theory's limits and usefulness by examining
the theorist's starting points.
Legal theory is not different in these respects from any other
intellectual enterprise, and accounts of the common law's subdivisions
would be prey to the same difficulties and objections as other types of
theories. We would normally expect, however, that as part of the task
of refining and defending her theory, the theorist would come to
review the conception on which she relies. 19 Along these lines, an
adequate theory of one of the common law's parts would be understood as one for which the legal phenomena to be explained could be
defensibly distinguished from other, unanalyzed aspects of law.
While we might anticipate that the pretheoretical characterization of
the subject matter could influence the theory's focus, we would ordinarily expect that the initial conception's limitations would come to
be examined as part of the theory's development. In the normal
course of a theory's development, therefore, those limitations would
be exposed and the resulting theory should not be limited by the
defects of the theorist's conception.
Unfortunately, theorists who have sought to explain parts of the
common law have not discussed their subject's distinctiveness, nor
their criteria for classification.2" What warrants selecting some
19. For a useful account of how this review and reappraisal might proceed for a model in
the development of a physical theory, see Spector, Models and Theories, in READINGS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 276, 287-90 (B. Brody ed. 1970).
20. There are some notable exceptions. In his early writings, Oliver Wendell Holmes
showed a keen sensitivity to these problems. For example, he contrasted the propriety of
contract as a distinct legal subject with that of telegraphs:
Rules of law, therefore, must be grouped with reference to some set of facts
or other. The effort of a text-writer or codifier should be to seize those of which
the presence is necessary to bring into operation a distinct rule of law. Thus,
contract is a proper head, because the fact that a certain agreement has been

made, has attached to it a series of legal consequences which would not exist
without it....

Telegraphs, on the other hand, is not a proper head under which to collect
what is generally included there, because most of the cases stated are simply
illustrations of the law of principal and agent or of contract, if the decisions are
right. The circumstance that a telegraphic company was concerned is purely
dramatic, and has no legal significance.
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authorities, doctrines, or trends, but not others, as part of the data
that an adequate theory of contract should explain? Why does the
theorist suppose that contract is different from tort? To the extent

that different and competing conceptions can be identified at work in
various accounts of common law subjects, few theorists have pursued
the important differences among the various competitors.2 1 This general problem is underscored for theories of one of the common law's
subdivisions by the fact that a theory of a particular area of the common law presupposes that area's distinctiveness.22 In attempting to
His BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS
AND PAPERS 60-61 (H. Shriver ed. 1936). Justice Holmes had earlier objected on the same
grounds to books on the law of torts, id. at 45, but later came to believe that torts exemplified a
sufficient degree of conceptual coherence to qualify as a proper topic. See Holmes, The Theory
of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652 (1873), reprinted in THE FORMATIVE ESSAYS OF JUSTICE
HOLMES 117 (F. Kellogg ed. 1984).
21. Some legal theorists have recently sought to articulate different conceptions of the law
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES:

that might be important in legal decisions. See, e.g., Summers, Working Conceptions of "The
Law," 1 LAW & PHIL. 263 (1982). Ronald Dworkin has, in a variety of writings, pointed to
salient conceptions of the law that, he argues, influence the way in which lawyers and scholars

respond to questions about the proper role of judges in a legal system. See R. DWORKIN, supra
note 1, at 82-130; R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 11-32 (1985); R. DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE 6-11, passim (1986). Neither Summers nor Dworkin, however, has explicitly
formulated his ideas about conceptions of the law in a way that could be applied to the task of
theorizing about one of the common law's subdivisions.

22. I do not mean to imply that problems of differentiation and classification are not
important elsewhere in legal theory. There are, for example, interesting questions about how
properly to distinguish common law from other forms of law, questions that parallel the
concerns of this article about developing a theory of one of the common law's subdivisions.

See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FUNCTION FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982);
Atiyah, Common Law and Statutes, 48 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1985). These issues would be
significant for any theory of the common law that posits a sharp division between common and
other law; and they might also be important to a theory of comparative law. Moreover, there

are judicial decisions that are difficult to classify: are they part of the common law or are they
something different? For example, certain cases are sometimes said to be decided "in the
equity of a statute." See, e.g., Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL
ESSAYS 213 (R. Pound ed. 1934). Other decisions invoke judicially fashioned maxims of
statutory construction, such as the maxim that statutes in derogation of the common law
should be "strictly" construed. See, e.g., 0. HETZEL, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 329-56
(1980). These decisions are problematic because they appear to embody, on the one hand, the
kind of judicial role commonly envisioned for the common law and yet, on the other hand,
invoke the sort of justification or legitimacy commonly associated with legislation.
A theory that sought to differentiate the common law from other types of law would have
to rely on some basis or other to distinguish the common law, properly so called, and establish
some criteria to classify problematic decisions as common law or other law. A theory with this
ambition would therefore be haunted by the issues of differentiation and classification that, I
argue, trouble accounts of the common law's subdivisions. However, there can be a variety of
different theories of the common law, and many of these may escape the quandaries of
differentiation and classification. Among other things, the legal community's use of the term
"common law" is so diverse that different theories of the common law may have widely
divergent objectives. For example, a theorist of the common law may seek to explain legal
norms that derive from judicial decisions, as opposed to norms that are legislative or
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explain one of the common law's subdivisions, the theorist relies on a
conception that distinguishes that subdivision from the rest. But a
failure to reexamine the adequacy of her basis for differentiation and
classification calls into question her effort to provide a special account
of that part of the common law. Finally, the significance of a theorist's conception is of vital importance when examining theories that
attempt to justify some part of the common law. Theories of this kind
argue that certain moral norms might explain the cases, doctrines, or
trends of that part of the law. But whether contract-or any other
subdivision of the common law-should be seen as moral depends on
how the theorist conceives of that subdivision of the common law.
In sum, a theorist begins with some conception or other of her
subject matter, and the particular conception on which she relies can
have important consequences for the structure and adequacy of the
resulting theory. This is true for any intellectual enterprise, but it is
of especial significance for theories of one of the common law's subdivisions. The following sections of this article demonstrate these
points through an examination of Fried's theory that contract is based
on the moral obligation to keep one's promises.
III.

FRIED'S THEORY OF CONTRACT

It is central to Contractas Promise that contract be recognized as
having a distinct nature and legal structure; it is not just some casual
topic for examination. Fried articulates twin ambitions for his work:
"At the level of theory I hope to show that the law of contract does
have an underlying, unifying structure, and at the level of doctrinal
exposition I hope to show that that structure can be referred to moral
principles."2
More specifically, he focuses on what he calls the promise principle-"that principle by which persons may impose on themselves
obligations where none existed before."' 24 In promising, Fried argues,
constitutional in origin. She may, as a result, propound a theory of the "common law," relying
on the common law's traditionally acknowledged decisional nature. For a theory of this type,
the boundaries that separate common law from other sorts of law and the proper classification
of some of the problematic decisions noted above may be less central than other issues relating
to the legitimacy within a democratic system of judicially created norms. Alternatively, a
theorist may be interested in the historical development of the common law of England, or the
parallels in legal development of different American states. That is, the theorist could be
drawn to consider the factors that lead to convergent development of law in different
jurisdictions. A theory that sought to explain the "common law" in the sense of such common
legal developments would also not be troubled by the problems of classification and
differentiation that I have noted.
23. C. FRIED, supra note 7, at i.
24. Id. at 1.
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we intentionally invoke a social convention whose function it is to
give moral grounds to others to rely on our promises.2 5 It is wrong to
invoke the convention in order to make the promise, and then to
break it,2 6 and we therefore incur a moral obligation to do as we have
promised. It is this moral obligation to keep our promises that Fried
asserts to be the "moral basis" of contract law. 2 Because the moral
obligation to keep one's promise is distinct from other common law
principles, Fried is claiming that contract has its own special place in
any liberal theory of law.
There are three reasons why Contract as Promise is notable
within legal scholarship and deserving of special attention. First, the
argument about contract's relation to promise-keeping is developed in
great detail. Indeed, while I maintain that Fried's argument is unsuccessful, his claim of a connection between contract and promise-keeping is at least initially plausible. Lawyers and judges would tend to
agree that promising is important to contract. The Restatement of
Contracts, an effort by contract scholars to articulate the basic structure of contract law, confirms this connection: "A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes
as a duty."2 After stating his account of the moral force of promising, Fried takes pains to relate several authorities and rules of the law
of contracts to the promise principle. In a series of sometimes intricate discussions he reviews elements of the traditional collection of
contract doctrines: contract formation, enforceability, performance,
the residual gap-fillers, and remedies. By working from the morass of
actual contract law he develops the promise principle into a theoretical structure that might rationalize contract, as he identifies it, and
account for its distinctiveness.
Second, Fried's enterprise is notable in that his argument revives
what legal scholarship has come to call the subjective or will theory of
contract, 29 which urges that contractual liability be imposed because,
and only to the extent that, the individual has voluntarily undertaken
such liability. On Fried's version, the promisor is liable because he
has deliberately invoked the convention of promising and thereby
25. Id. at 16.
26. Id. at 17.
27. Id. at 1.
28. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1932).
29. See, e.g., Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 942-46
(1967). Professor Patterson cites the German legal scholar Savigny as "[t]he classical
exponent of the will theory for modern law." Patterson, Equitable Relief for Unilateral
Mistake, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 859, 861 (1928).
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given the promisee moral grounds to rely on the promise. The will
theory seems to have been more prominent over a century ago. Scholars and judges described a contract as a "meeting of the minds," and
if, because the processes of contract formation failed in some way, the
minds had not met, then there was no contract. 30 But, the will theory
fell from favor thereafter, and contract scholars shifted from an individualistic understanding of contractual liability to a view of contract
that is sometimes referred to as an objective theory. On this latter
view, the appropriate basis for imposing contractual liability was held
to be the needs of society for an efficient and reliable regime of
enforceable transactions. Liability might thus be imposed in some circumstances when the parties had not intended to make a contractwhen, in other words, their minds had not met. 3 1 Thus, Fried's success would mean that contract scholarship could need significant
revision.
Third, Fried's argument in favor of contract as a distinct part of
the common law contrasts sharply with a line of modem scholarship
that proclaims contract's death. This line of reasoning holds that contract, as modem lawyers think of it, is a recent legal development.
Prior to the middle of the 19th century, the thesis runs, there was only
a generalized law of obligations and a collection of subspecialitiesparticular types of agreements such as the law merchant, maritime
law, and negotiable instruments, to name a few.32 Contract emerged
in response to the special legal needs of an entrepreneurial society.
Those needs have since diminished, at least in comparison with other
societal needs, and contract should be expected to wither and ultimately die. Its corpse will be reabsorbed back into the law of obligations, to mingle with and contribute its nutrients to tort. Contract's
death has been announced or assumed by several distinguished scholars, especially a number of legal historians. 33 Fried rejects this contention; he seems determined to show that the rumors of contract's
death are greatly exaggerated.
These three features make Fried's argument an apt focus for my
discussion. It is controversial whether contract does indeed have a
special and distinct place in the common law, and Fried's argument
should therefore indicate the bases on which he proposes to identify
the law of contracts. His decisions as to the proper boundaries of
contract law will therefore be important to his thesis, and the detail of
30.
31.
32.
33.

See Farnsworth, supra note 29, at 945.
See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 8-12 (1974).
See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA (1965); G. GILMORE, supra

note 32.
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his discussion provides a variety of instances in which we may
examine his inclusion or exclusion of relevant phenomena from the
data to be explained. The fact that Fried is proposing a significant
departure from the received view of contract law highlights the question of how a theorist selects the relevant phenomena for a theory of
contract law. If the law of contracts as Fried identifies it is significantly different from the law as commonly recognized, how can we
compare and evaluate the rival theories?
IV.

CONTRACT LAW AS RULES AND CASES

A.

The Simple Conception

From the standpoint of the Simple conception, the law of contracts consists of the standard structure of cases and rules which one
finds in a traditional legal treatise.34 An adequate theory of contract
law would therefore explain the holdings in those standard cases that
consider issues of contractual liability. It would agree with the rules
that are stated in the treatises or the Restatement, rules that are frequently cited by courts as authority for their decisions.
Various aspects of legal practice support this conception. Legal
treatises, law school curricula, and the services that report and annotate judicial decisions will commonly agree, at least as a matter of
broad generality, on contract's doctrinal structure. A contract must
be formed, and the process of agreement is usually controlled by rules
that prescribe effective offers and acceptances.35 There are certain
requisites for the agreement to be enforceable: consideration or one of
its substitutes, capacity of the parties, and absence of fraud, duress,
34. Accord N. SIMMONDS, CENTRAL ISSUES IN JURISPRUDENCE: JUSTICE, LAW &
1-5 (1986) (describing the "black letter view"). On separate occasions (and under

RIGHTS

different labels) Ronald Dworkin has pointed to a similar conception of law. See

LAW'S
EMPIRE, supra note 21, at 6-11 (identifying the "plain fact" view of law); A MATTER OF

supra note 21, at 11-30 (discussing the "rule-book" conception of law). In each
case, he contrasts those conceptions with his own, putatively more sophisticated, vision of law
that he has termed the rights conception, see A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 21, at 1112 and passim, and more recently "law as integrity," see LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 21. I
PRINCIPLE,

argue in Section V that Dworkin's alternative vision of law is best understood (whatever its
current label) as a version of the Legal Process conception. See infra text accompanying notes
75-82.
In Dworkin's discussions of these variations of the Simple conception, he is chiefly
concerned with the question, "What is the Law?" Although one consequence of each
conception of the common law is to identify the relevant law of contracts to be explained, the
focus of this article is different from the focus of Dworkin's writings. While he is concerned
with the nature of law and the proper form of judicial decisions, see infra text accompanying
note 76, this article focuses instead on the criteria for adequate theorizing about the common
law's separate parts.
35. See, e.g., A FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 105-210 (1982).
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coercion, illegality, or fundamental mistake.3 6 For contracts of certain specified types, a signed writing is required for the agreement to
be enforceable. 37 The parties must perform their respective obligations, and there are rules of interpretation and construction that elaborate on the terms the parties have agreed upon if their meaning
becomes controversial.3 " Other rules will provide terms or dictate an
order of performance where the parties have failed to agree on all the
contract's particulars.3 9 Finally, there are rules that govern the remedies to be granted in the event that the parties fail to meet their obligations.'
While there will be variations across jurisdictions, the
standard sources converge on this basic picture.
Lawyers and judges also converge on fundamental questions of
classification. Legal practice supposes that there are generally
acknowledged boundaries between contract disputes and other legal
controversies. In some cases the proper resolution of a dispute may
depend on a question of classification, and judicial decisions sometimes include a holding that the controversy at hand is a question of
contract law rather than tort, or vice versa.4 1
B.

Fried's Reliance on the Simple Conception

Several facets of Fried's argument indicate that he relies on this
conception of contract law and that he holds his theory to be adequate
because it justifies contract's traditional doctrinal structure in terms of
our obligation to keep promises. First, there is Fried's own characterization of his enterprise. It is his avowed ambition to show that contract law has a unifying doctrinal structure and that this structure can
be "referred" to moral principles.4 2
Second, there is the structure of his book's discussion. Successive
chapters review many of the traditional rules and standard cases, justifying the various doctrines in terms of the promise principle. For
example, he distinguishes true promises from mere vows, and contends that a true promise is binding because it has been accepted in
some sense by the promisee.4" This feature, he argues, warrants the
36. Id. at 39-104 (consideration and substitute grounds for enforceability); 213-32 (status
and capacity); 232-71 (fraud, duress, coercion, and misrepresentation); 293-368 (unconscionability, illegality, and public policy).
37. Id. at 369-441 (Statute of Frauds).
38. Id. at 445-534 (interpretation and gap-filling).
39. Id. at 535-645.
40. Id. at 811-914.
41. See, e.g., Carpel v. Saget Studios, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (plaintiffs are
required to proceed on breach of contract, as opposed to tort, theory).
42. See supra text accompanying note 23.
43. C. FRIED, supra note 7, at 41-43.
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constellation of rules that dictate that an offer must be accepted for an
enforceable agreement to result." To demonstrate the power of his
distinction, Fried even pursues one of contract's notable white rabbits:
he analyzes the Mailbox Rule, which holds that a mailed acceptance
of a written offer is effective as soon as the acceptance is posted
(unless the offeror has stipulated actual receipt), 45 arguing that its dictates are consistent with the promise principle.46
A third feature of Fried's argument which indicates his reliance
on the Simple conception is his handling of the dominant theory of
consideration. The common law has never imposed liability for a
promise, without more. To be enforceable, a promise is commonly
said to require consideration or one of its substitutes. The dominant
explanation of consideration is the bargain theory: a promise is
enforceable if it has been bargained for, and a promise is bargained for
if it is given in exchange for a return promise or performance. 47 The
most notable type of promise that may lack consideration is the promise to make a gift. At one point in contract's past, promises were
generally unenforceable if they lacked consideration; gift promises, no
44. Id. at 45-48.
45. See, e.g., A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, at 161-71.

46. C. FRIED, supra note 7, at 50-52. Adducing instances of a scholar's reliance on the
Simple conception is made complex by one salient feature of this conception. I argue in
Section V that the Legal Process conception is importantly different from the Simple
conception because the latter, but not the former, provides for evaluations of the existing state
of the law. See infra text accompanying notes 79-80. Nonetheless, in some circumstances the
two conceptions converge on the same picture of the law of contracts that should be explained
by an adequate theory. The two conceptions will identify the same set of rules and doctrines to
be explained if the traditional set is not only commonly acknowledged by the standard treatises
and Restatements, but is also in accord with the principles and policies of law that underlie
contract. It then follows that Fried's apparent reliance on the Simple conception to identify
the rules that need accounting for could be construed instead as an elliptical form of reliance
on the Legal Process conception: he seeks to explain the existing doctrines just because they
are in accord with the promise principle as he articulates it.
Because of the logical possibility that under certain circumstances the two conceptions
will converge, it is difficult to establish beyond all doubt the claim that any given theorist relies
on the Simple as opposed to the Legal Process conception. Moreover, because I argue later
that Fried also relies on the Legal Process conception of contract law, see infra text
accompanying notes 83-90, I cannot rule out the possibility that Fried is, in fact, covertly
relying on the Legal Process conception where I interpret him as relying on the Simple
conception instead. Still, two features of Fried's argument confirm my claim that he relies not
only on the Legal Process conception but on the Simple conception as well. One feature that
confirms his use of the simple conception is his discussion of the doctrine of consideration. See
infra note 53. Another is his easy acceptance of the "law of contract" as a given to be
explained. See supra note 23. This indicates that he has adopted the Simple conception's
identification of the relevant law to be explained, rather than attempting to rebuild in
accordance with the promise principle only those rules of contract law that would be needed
on some independent assessment of the law.
47. See, e.g., A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, at 44-46; G. GILMORE, supra note 32, at 6065, 69-70.
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matter how sincerely made, were usually denied enforcement. 48 Modem developments, however, have anointed several surrogates, of
which the most prominent are promissory estoppel (or detrimental
reliance) 49 and, in some jurisdictions, "moral" consideration. 50 In the
right circumstances, a gift promise may be enforceable on the strength
of one of these bases even though it lacks classical consideration.5 1
If, on the Simple conception, an adequate theory must explain
the standard doctrinal structure, then Fried should justify in terms of
the promise principle the distinctions that contract draws between
enforceable and unenforceable promises. Fried prefers to finesse this
question. He reviews the bargain theory and pronounces it incoherent. Accordingly, he finds no intellectual obligation to justify it or the
distinctions it would make. This stratagem means that Fried has not
explained all the traditional structure, and he acknowledges this failing. In summarizing his discussion of consideration he says: "I conclude that the life of contract is indeed promise, but this conclusion is
not exactly a statement of positive law.... My conclusion is rather
that the doctrine of consideration offers no coherent alternative basis
for the force of contracts."5 2
Although his treatment of consideration deviates from the strictures of the Simple conception, his argument on this point confirms
his reliance on that conception, for he takes pains to defend his departure. The bargain theory is incoherent and it therefore poses no real
objection to the promise theory. Fried's argument implies that a
coherent part of contract law which could not be squared with the
promise principle should count against his view, and he feels an intellectual obligation to square his theory with the details of settled law.5 3
C. Assessing the Simple Conception
The Simple conception of law is not without its homey virtues.
48. See, e.g., A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, at 46-48.

49. See id. at 89-98.
50. Id. at 52-59.
51. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 86 (moral consideration), 90

(promissory estoppel) (1979).
52. C. FRIED, supra note 7, at 37-38.
53. This point indicates Fried's reliance on the Simple conception, as opposed to some
elliptical reliance on the Legal Process conception. See supra note 46. For, were he to rely,
convertly, on the Legal Process conception, the relevant question would not be whether he
could dismiss the traditional requirement of consideration but whether he could identify
aspects of it that are in accord with the principles and policies that underlie contract law. Or,
failing to establish a connection between the promise principle and the consideration
requirement for that reason, as Fried does in other cases. See infra text accompanying notes
71-72.
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At the very least, it provides lawyers and judges with an easily ascertained point of departure for their arguments. Further, if the law
could be cast into a comprehensive and stable structure of doctrines
and cases, then private parties would find it easier to conform their
activities to the dictates of law and evaluate their potential liabilities.
Finally, the Simple conception commends itself as a corrective to an
overactive judiciary. At least if the Simple conception is understood
to preclude judge-made changes in the law, then reliance on this conception may prevent judicial originality or creativity.54
By itself the Simple conception provides only a partial answer to
the question, "What is the law of contracts?" The standard structure
provides the theorist with a set of rules and cases to be explained, but
it provides no criteria for evaluating new developments in contract
law. We expect, however, that contract law will change in at least
some respects over time. Judges will make new applications of
existing rules, extend established rules to new kinds of controversies,
and sometimes formulate altogether new rules. Unless contract law
were to become stagnant, a theorist needs criteria by which to assess
its developments. Are these new doctrines part of contract law properly so called? Or, are they better understood as belonging elsewhere
in the common law? Because the Simple conception simply refers to
the doctrinal structure which is represented in the standard sources, it
fails the theorist in this crucial respect. The theorist must either
derive the needed criteria from some other source or else abandon the
Simple conception in favor of some alternative.
The emergence of promissory estoppel is an example of the kind
of development that throws our classifications into question. For
some time courts tended to deny enforcement if a promise was not
supported by consideration, even when the promisee had relied on the
promise.55 Thus, a promise to give my granddaughter a sum of
money would lack consideration if my promise was not induced by a
return promise or performance on her part. Promissory estoppel
makes my promise enforceable if I knew (or had reason to know) that
she would rely on the promise to her detriment, and she did in fact so
rely.56 Promissory estoppel now affects more issues than just the
promise to make a gift. In some cases, for example, an unaccepted
offer has been held to give rise to liability, where the offeree has relied
54. See, e.g., Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 49-55, 141 A.2d 276,
288-91 (1958) (Heher, J., dissenting); Riemann v. Monmouth Consol. Water Co., 9 N.J. 134,
139, 87 A.2d 325, 327 (1952).
55. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
56. The example is drawn from Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898)
(grandfather's promise enforced against his estate because of "equitable" estoppel).
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to his detriment before his acceptance was effective.57
How should a theorist treat promissory estoppel? Early courts
seemed nervous about enforcing promises for which, under the traditional definition, there was no consideration. Some judges resorted to
subterfuge: they stretched the consideration definition in order to
hold the particular promisor liable, while avoiding, at least on the
surface, the appearance of significant change. 58 Others favored indirection, styling enforcement of the promise as a dictate of equity
rather than of law. 59 At some point, judges and commentators came
to accept promissory estoppel as a legitimate addition to contractrecognizing, perhaps, that its effect is to enforce promises that were
freely given. But there are clouds on the current horizon that may
foreshadow a future shift away from its present acceptance as part of
contract.60
One cannot determine from the Simple conception alone whether
an adequate theory of contract law should account for promises that
are enforced on the grounds of detrimental reliance. Because the Simple conception simply assumes the standard structure of cases and
doctrines, it provides no substantive criteria for proper classification
of novel legal actions. In general, it appears that the Simple conception would suffice only if distinguishing contract issues from other
aspects of the common law were an unproblematic task. But, it can
be seen that discriminating among the various facets of the common
law is more complicated and controversial than might at first appear.
To decide a case, judges frequently need to classify the dispute or
some salient aspect of it. Is this an action for breach of contract, or
for tort? Did the offeree's response to the offer constitute a valid
acceptance, or a counter-offer? Legal controversies, however, do not
wear their proper labels on their sleeves. There are two aspects of the
judicial decision process that imply that the proper classification of a
case will be a matter of ongoing controversy.
First, how a judge characterizes a controversy can sometimes be
the end result of judicial reflection on the nature of the dispute rather
than the beginning point. Frequently, the ultimate disposition of a
case will turn on the judge's classification. Given the facts of a particular dispute and the existing state of doctrine, it may well be that the
action is effectively resolved if the court holds that the dispute is one
57. See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
58. For an extended argument that the New York Court of Appeals was attempting this
sort of stretching during Cardozo's tenure, see G. GILMORE, supra note 32, at 62-63.
59. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 149-55.
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of contract and not, say, of tort, instead. So, if liability attaches only
upon the promisor's being held to have made a contract, and if the
court feels compelled, for whatever reason, to hold the promisor liable, then there will be an impetus towards holding that the promisor
made a contract. By the same token, if a contract can be found only
if one party is held to have made a promise to another, then there may
be an impetus towards concluding that a promise was made. 61 The
judge's classification of a controversy might not be the first step of his
reflection about how to resolve the dispute; it may instead follow from
those reflections. As a result, the judicial decision process may well
lead to the imposition of contractual liability where previously no
contract would have been found.
Second, on any tenable conception of the common law, judicial
decisions comprise an important part of that law. Because the common law of contracts is at least in part precedential, what a judge now
characterizes as a contract dispute will depend on how judges in the
past have distinguished contracts from other legal relations. Even if
past courts have, by some standard or other, been "wrong" in their
classification-that is, have counted some disputes as contract matters
that, by some theorist's lights, should have been relegated to torts
instead-those past errors might now be embedded in the law of contracts in virtue of other judges having followed those "wrong" decisions. 62 Thus, contract law's current set of classifications may not
resemble the discriminations that were drawn at some point in the
common law's past and might not, moreover, reflect the classifications
that appeal to laymen. Contract's language and important terms may
frequently be matters of art.
These two factors combine. Thus, result-oriented judges may
find contractual liability in cases where prior cases did not, and the
generally precedential nature of the common law means that those
willful decisions, once reached, guide later judges in their deliberations. Contract law may therefore change across time, and theorists,
even those relying on the Simple conception, will ultimately need a
basis for discriminating among the new developments.
D. Problems with Fried's Reliance on the Simple Conception
Fried's use of the Simple conception of law demonstrates both its
61. See also infra text accompanying notes 63-69.
62. "The half truths of one generation tend at times to perpetuate themselves in the law as
the whole truths of another, when constant repetition brings it about that qualifications, taken
once for granted, are disregarded or forgotten." Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua
County Bank of Jamestown, 246 N.Y. 369, 373, 159 N.E. 173, 174 (1927) (Cardozo, J.).
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usefulness and its failings. Judges and practitioners rely on the standard structure of cases and doctrines as the point of departure for
their arguments, and Fried begins his argument with agreed-upon
doctrines and well-established cases. But, while judges and practitioners might work to modify (or defend) particular parts of contract
law, they can content themselves with the general structure. Fried's
theoretical ambitions require him to go further. He claims to justify
all of contract law, and his arguments must be similarly sweeping in
their scope of application. It can be seen, however, that his effort at
justification is undermined by problems of the Simple conception.
First, the judicial willfulness noted above vitiates his argument that
contract law is based on the moral obligation to keep one's promises.
It is a consequence of this willfulness that the "promises" now recognized by contract law differ from the promises for which Fried can
claim a moral obligation. Second, various contract doctrines that
Fried himself regards as inconsistent with the promise principle refute
his claim that contract law can be explained by reference to promisekeeping's important features. Because the Simple conception does not
provide any criteria for modifying the standard structure, Fried cannot, consistently with the Simple conception, ignore the deviant
"promises" that are recognized by the law, nor can he reject those
doctrines that are intractable for the promise principle.
An act that is characterized as a promise by contract law is not
necessarily a promise from the point of view of morality. For Fried, a
promise is an act that voluntarily invites another person to rely on the
promisor's stated plans and intentions. "An individual is morally
bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally invoked a
convention whose function it is to give grounds-moral grounds-for
another to expect the promised performance." 63 But, as was argued
above, an inclination to provide a contractual remedy can lead the
court to characterize the parties' relationship as contractual. And if a
contract is deemed to involve a promise or set of promises, as the
Restatement indicates, then the inclination to provide a contractual
remedy can also lead a judge to characterize one party's remarks as
amounting to a promise. The fact that a court styles those avowals as
promissory does not mean that the party who is held liable invoked,
in any meaningful sense, the convention of promising.
In short, a significant selection of avowals that are enforced by
the law of contracts are not promises as we would standardly recognize them in moral theory. This fact is demonstrated most powerfully
by the curious phenomenon of implied at law promises. These
63. C.

FRIED,

supra note 7, at 16.
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promises are one of two kinds of "implied" promises recognized by
contract law.' The other kind are implied in fact, which are really
promises, but not explicit. "Implied at law" is usually better understood to mean "imposed by law." That is, the putative "promisor" is
held liable as if he had promised, whether or not he actually did so.
Sometimes it is said that the bound party is "deemed" to have made a
promise, but on such occasions it is clear that the deeming is of the
law, and not of the facts of the situation. Implied at law promises are
usually not promises at all, except in the consequences imposed on the
promisor.
Implied at law promises are useful devices for courts that seek to
readjust the respective rights of particular types of parties, especially
in transactions that threaten a recurring kind of unfairness.65 For
example, if I make you an offer you might, before actually accepting
my offer, begin either the performance that I ask for or, instead, preparation for that performance. Standard contract law holds that the
offeror is master of his offer and that I may therefore withdraw my
offer without liability at any time before you accept it. 66 If I withdraw
the offer after you have begun preparation or performance but before
you have accepted, then you will be out of pocket to the extent that
you had expended time or money on the prospective contract, no matter how reasonable your actions. In short, the offer that has been
relied on but not yet accepted can pose a risk of unfairness to the
offeree. One way for a court to alleviate that unfairness is to posit an
implied promise. If you had begun performance or preparation, I
might be deemed to have made an "implied subsidiary promise" not
to withdraw my offer until you had had a reasonable time in which to
accept it. By deeming me to have made such an implied promise, the
court could hold me liable as if I had so promised, even though I
never did any such thing.6 7
Perceived unfairness is frequently an engine for change in contract law, and implying a promise in the situation of the relied-on
offer is only one instance of a long history of promises implied by a
court to prevent such unfairness. While this type of judicial intervention might not pose any great theoretical concern if we could always
distinguish the implied at law promise from other implied promises,
courts are frequently not so forthcoming as to acknowledge that the
64. See, e.g., 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 38-39, 44-50 (1963).
65. Implied at law promises have played a role throughout contract's history. See, e.g., J.
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 282-87, 293-98 (1979).
66. See, e.g., A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, at 148.
67. See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 413-14, 333 P.2d 757, 759-60
(1958).
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"implication" in a particular case is legal rather than factual. Moreover, there are instances where courts have either overlooked or deliberately fudged the difference between the two kinds of implication. 68
Finally, the precedential nature of the common law means that in
future cases, a past lack of judicial precision (or lack of candor) could
engender contract liability on the strength of a nonpromise,69 without
acknowledging the gap between ordinary language and contract's
terms of art. In short, what contract law now labels a promise, may
well not be a promise at all.
What bedevils Fried's account is that the Simple conception of
contract law provides no criteria for assessing whether some novel
judicial decision is consistent with the standard set of doctrines and
cases. Lacking such criteria, Fried cannot claim that some particular
holding is wrong as a matter of law just because it is at variance with
the promise principle. For example, recent cases have employed the
doctrine of unconscionability to void agreements that, in the courts'
eyes, are grossly unfair or oppressive. 70 For Fried, some of these decisions are wrong. If a promise was freely made then it should be
enforced, 71 social or economic inequalities notwithstanding. Correcting those inequalities is the obligation of society in general, he
argues, and not properly the burden of the party who benefits from
those inequalities in his agreements.
In other places, Fried proposes the wholesale abandonment of
established doctrines. In their agreement the parties may fail to anticipate every possible occurrence that might bear on their contract, and
contract law has equipped itself with doctrines that regulate agreements that events unprovided for have undermined in some way. The
"gap-filling" doctrines of mistake, frustration of purpose, and impossibility (or impracticability) allow in the proper case one party to
escape his contractual obligations.7 The unanticipated event means
that one party will suffer a loss-either the party who is forced to
perform (even though performance must be rendered in a world significantly different from that contemplated at the time of the agreement) or else the other party who, if the first party is excused, is
68. See, e.g., Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246
N.Y. 369, 377, 159 N.E. 173, 179 (1927) (Cardozo held the promisor liable for the promise of a
gift to the college on the strength of the college's subjecting "itself to ... a duty at the implied
request of the promisor." What Cardozo does not pursue is that the request looks significantly

more implied at law than in fact.).
69. Jules Coleman interprets the development of promissory estoppel in this way. See J.
MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 191-92 (1984).
70. See, e.g., A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, at 307-19.

71. C. FRIED, supra note 7, at 104-09.
72. See, e.g., A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, at 647-705.
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deprived of the promised performance. These gap-filling doctrines
generally place a burden of proof on the party who seeks to escape his
obligations: he must show that the circumstances warrant his being
excused.73

On Fried's view these doctrines are wrong-headed. When the
parties' fundamental assumptions turn out to be mistaken, then no
contract was ever formed. To revert to the old metaphor, their minds
did not meet. Because there is no contract, it is wrong to hold either
party to the purported agreement. Traditional doctrine goes awry, he
suggests, because it supposes that one party or the other must bear the
loss. 74 The question, "Who should bear the loss?" ought to be distinct
from the question, "Is there a contract?" If there is a contract, then
the agreement imposes the loss on the party who agreed to bear it.
But, when the agreement was never made it is fairer and more sensible, he argues, to require the parties to split the loss, relying on equitable principles rather than the promise principle to allocate the loss to
be borne.
When Fried rejects the current use of unconscionability and the
existing doctrines of mistake, frustration, and impossibility, he is
rejecting the traditional doctrinal structure as inadequate and, on
these particular questions, proposing his own analysis in its stead.
When he eschews the bargain theory of consideration his position is,
at least in part, justifiable on general grounds of theory construction
and acceptability. No theory, he might well argue, should be required
to justify an incoherent doctrine. But his rejection of unconscionability's excesses and gap-filling's wrong-headedness is different. He
rejects these facets of the traditional doctrinal structure because they
do not conform to the moral principles he espouses. Thus, at least on
these questions he finds the Simple conception of contract law unsatisfactory; he requires instead some further grounds for choosing the
legal phenomena that his theory might explain. He cannot advance
his theory by relying on the Simple conception alone, because that
conception provides no basis for evaluating legal developments that
he disfavors.
V.

CONTRACT LAW AS PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

A.

The Legal Process Conception of Law

A more complex conception of contract law would include the
principles and policies (sometimes denoted collectively as "stan73. Id.
74. C. FRIED, supra note 7, at 64-67.
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dards")7 5 that might be employed by judges to modify a rule of contract law or extend it into new circumstances, to resolve a conflict
among authorities, or to justify the creation of new law. On this conception, an adequate theory of contract law would agree for the most
part with the rules that comprise contract's commonly relied on doctrinal structure and explain most of the standard cases. The impetus
to include principles and policies as important parts of contract law
stems from the recognition that the traditional structure might need
revision and that its various authorities might be in tension and need
reconciliation. So, on this conception of law, it is unlikely that an
adequate theory would explain all of the standard cases or agree
entirely with the received doctrinal structure. Rather, it would
explain some mix of cases and rules, together with the principles and
policies that regulate or justify the cases and rules.
Ronald Dworkin made the philosophical community sensitive to
this conception of law when he argued, in challenging H.L.A. Hart's
version of legal positivism, that decisional law includes principles and
policies as well as cases and rules.7 6 In legal scholarship, this conception is often associated with the views of Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks, as revealed in their unpublished manuscript, The Legal Process."' Although the discussion that follows may deviate in various
ways from Hart and Sacks' picture, I will call this the Legal Process
conception in recognition of their contributions.7 8
Legal practice reflects this conception in various ways. Advocates will base their arguments on claims of principle and policy, and
judges will refer to various standards as warrants for their decisions.79
What is perhaps most important is that including principles and policies gives us a more elegant and powerful conception of law. The
Simple conception was deficient, it was argued above, in that it provides no criteria for assessing changes in the law.8 ° The Legal Process
conception cures that deficiency: warranted developments in contract
law will further the principles or policies that lie behind the past deci75. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 22.

76. Id.
77. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND

APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958).
78. I have argued elsewhere that Dworkin's writings about the nature of law and the
proper role of the judge should be read as expounding the same basic views as Hart and Sacks
articulated in their manuscript. See Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The
Legacy of Hart and Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. - (1987).
79. See, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (referring to standard that
one should not profit from one's own wrongdoing).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62.
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sions.8 1 Moreover, the Simple conception provides no criteria for
determining the scope of contractual liability.8 2 Including principles
and policies in our conception of the law can aid that determination:
if some development conforms to the principles and policies that
rationalize contract decisions, then the conformity gives grounds for
counting that development as part of contract law. Indeed, the Legal
Process conception even provides a basis for discerning contractual
liability where the lawyers and judges have styled the legal issue
otherwise; principles and policies may be more reliable than the
labels used by the participants.
B.

Fried's Reliance on the Legal Process Conception

Fried does not acknowledge his reliance on this conception of
law. Nevertheless, it is patent that his argument incorporates its features, for his very references to the promise principle confirms his use
of this conception. Fried does not argue that judges have explicitly
invoked the obligation to keep promises to support their holdings in
contract cases, nor that contract rules are, generally, expressed in
terms of the promise principle. Rather, he hopes to explain contract's
structure and evaluate its developments in terms of the principle.
Fried's treatment of promissory estoppel exemplifies his reliance
on the Legal Process conception. Promissory estoppel's inclusion in
contract law has been controversial, as noted above,8 3 and remains
problematic for the theorist.8 4 Fried uses the promise principle to
evaluate the legitimacy of estoppel's various facets. As Fried has
articulated the principle, every promise properly so called is potentially binding because the promisor has given moral grounds for acting on the promise. This includes promises to make a gift, which
traditionally were unenforceable because of the doctrine of consideration. Fried rejects the doctrine of consideration, and.with it the need
to distinguish some promises from others on the strength of the promisee's detrimental reliance. If there was a promise made, then it
deserves enforcement. 85 Promissory estoppel, in its traditional application to gift promises, is rendered otiose by his argument.
But promissory estoppel has now been applied beyond the context of gift promises. It has been employed, for example, to make the
offeror liable when the promisee has relied on, but not accepted, the
81. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motors, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (revising
tort standard for liability for inherently dangerous objects).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62.
83. Id.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.

85. C.

FRIED,

supra note 7, at 37.
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offer.8 6 On Fried's analysis the moral force of promising binds us only
to those acts that are promises properly so called, and that means that
they must have been accepted. 7 The unaccepted offer, although a
promise in form, should not create contractual liability for the offeror,
notwithstanding the offeree's reliance.8 8 The cases that have invoked
promissory estoppel to make a party liable for the relied-on offer are
wrong, on Fried's view, because they run counter to the promise principle. If the offeror acts wrongfully in withdrawing his offer his
actions may create tort liability, but the offer should not be made
enforceable as a contract merely because of the offeree's reliance.8 9
Finally, one sub-theme of Contractas Promise is Fried's attempt
to rebut recent contentions that contract law relies essentially on
other principles besides the promise principle. The literature on this
question has advanced two other candidates as the basis of contract
law: the reliance and the benefit (or restitution) principles. 90 At different places and in various contexts, Fried argues that the promise
principle provides a superior account of contract law than either of
these rivals. What confirms Fried's reliance on the Legal Process conception is the nature of his rebuttal. He does not challenge the coherence of attempting a theory of contract law predicated on principles
and policies; indeed, he does not even discuss the use of principles or
policies as an interesting theoretical move. He recognizes in these
rival theories the Legal Process conception at work, and finds it tolerable, although he maintains that the account provided by either the
reliance or benefit principles is inadequate.
C. Assessing the Legal Process Conception
Including principles and policies in our conception of the law of
contracts can provide a more powerful and elegant theory of contract
law. Inasmuch as the promise principle is, on this conception, a part
of contract law, Fried can justify his rejection of doctrines and appli86. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44. It is important to note in this regard that
what counts as an acceptance for Fried, suitable to distinguish the viable promise from the
unenforceable vow, is not the same as the reciprocal binding obligation necessary for
consideration. Therefore, some of the cases where the offeree has used and relied on the offer
would count for Fried as accepted promises and hence enforceable. See C. FRIED, supra note
7, at 54-56; see also Drennan v. Star Paving, 51 Cal.2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958). But see
James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933) (offer not accepted, although
used by offeree).
88. C. FRIED, supra note 7, at 54-56.
89. Id.
90. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52,
53-57 (1936).

1987]

CONCEPTIONS OF CONTRACT

cations that are not consistent with the promise principle. In these
respects, at least, the Legal Process conception seems to offer substantial advantages over the Simple conception. In other respects, however, we may question how satisfactory the Legal Process conception
really is. Its power and elegance derive from facets of the conception
that are either controversial and in need of further support, or else
incomplete and requiring further development. If the needed support
and refinement cannot be provided, the Legal Process cannot command acceptance.
One problem for the Legal Process conception is that of legitimacy. A judge may justify decisions that extend or change common
law rules by reference to the principles or policies of the law. But
what is it about principles and policies that warrants a judicial decision? The common law is fundamentally precedential in nature: a
judge's decision in the case at hand should derive from his general
obligation to decide like cases alike together with the past decisions in
similar cases. Why should a court feel bound to adhere to some standard? What precedential authority do principles and policies have?
While the Legal Process conception has been influential in legal
scholarship for the past thirty years,9 1 few legal theorists have
examined the legitimacy of principles and policies in our system of
law. Hart and Sacks posit the existence of these standards "underlying" legal rules.9 2 The most elaborate attempt to integrate legal standards into our conception of law is that which Ronald Dworkin
proposed. Dworkin initially argued, against H.L.A. Hart, that principles and policies are important constituents of law.93 His later writings suggest that only principles are legitimate bases for judicial
decisions that change the common law in any way.94 On Dworkin's
view, principles derive their legitimacy from their place in the best
available constitutional theory that justifies the legal system as a
whole.95 Principles (and possibly policies) are therefore authoritative
to the extent that they help generate a coherent explanation for precedent in the law. Put differently, courts cannot coherently treat like
cases alike without adequate criteria for likeness; principles and poli91. See, e.g., Vetter, Post-War Scholarship on JudicialDecisionmaking,23 J. LEGAL EDUC.
413 (1984); see also G. CALABRESI, THE COMMON LAW FUNCTION IN THE AGE OF
STATUTES (1982) (acknowledging Hart and Sacks' influence); Wellington, Common Law Rules
and ConstitutionalDouble Standards.- Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973)
(acknowledging influence of Hart and Sacks).
92. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 77, at 161-62.
93. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 22-45.
94. See id. at 81-130. But cf. Wellington, supra note 91 (disagreeing with Dworkin on the
strength of a different notion of the nature and role of legal principles).
95. R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 81-130.
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cies comprise part of the structure of the law that identifies relevant
similarities among cases.
The controversy about the legitimacy of standards within a system of precedent parallels in many respects a problem concerning the
precedential value of legal rules. After all, when judges announce a
legal rule binding on similar cases yet to be decided, that pronouncement is not obviously part of their holding for the case at hand. On
some views of the matter, at least, the strict dictates of stare decisis
deny to the pronouncement of a rule the very authority that it purports to have. 96 Nonetheless, it is clear that subsequent courts (and
the practicing bar) accord substantial weight to the announced rule.
It is plausible therefore that the rule's authority derives from its
coherence as an explanation of the total pattern of decisions. Dworkin's answer to the problem of a standard's legitimacy is thus appealing, for it puts standards on the same footing as legal rules.
But, Dworkin's resolution of the problem of legitimacy highlights another difficulty that attends the Legal Process conception:
given that principles and policies are, in some sense, warrants for legal
decisions, which legal decisions do they authorize? That is, if legal
standards are legitimate because they help explain past decisions, how
can the judge discern the content of those standards so as to arrive at
the correct decision in the case at hand? On any version of the Legal
Process conception, standards are abstract and general. It is uncertain how they could dictate any particular result in a given case.
Moreover, in Dworkin's view, a standard's validity derives from its
inclusion in the best theory that explains settled law. No particular
announcement of a standard is binding; no court's statement of a standard's scope or proper application is conclusive. It follows that it is
always open to reexamination just which principles and policies comprise the law of a given common law topic. Finally, there is no guarantee that legal standards are necessarily compatible in every case. In
any particular controversy, for example, the principle that we should
keep our promises may well conflict with the policy against substantial forfeitures, or with the policy against economic waste. How
should the court weigh the various legal standards against one
another?
One problem of the Legal Process conception bears particularly
on the task of developing a theory for some part of the common law.
Are there standards (or is there some set of standards) specific to particular areas of the common law- standards, for example, which can
help the theorist discriminate contract law from the rest? Fried sup96. See, e.g., E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2-3 (1948).
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poses that the promise principle is peculiar to contract law and marks
off contract from the rest of the law of obligations. But the history of
contract's development shows that promise-keeping was efficacious in
tort law as well, 97 and that other principles besides promise-keeping
have shaped contract law. 98 If the theorist is to differentiate contract
law from, say, tort by relying on a conception of law that includes
legal standards, then the standards themselves must provide the necessary distinction. But, the principles that seem efficacious in contract
decisions do not seem to serve the theorist in that fashion.
It is perhaps significant in this regard, that even Professor Dworkin has not attempted to mark off the various subspecialities of the
common law in terms of the applicable principles. At most, he ventures to remark on the principles that might bear on a particular
case. 99 Indeed, it is consistent with Dworkin's version of the Legal
Process conception, and suggested by it, that the boundaries among
the various parts of the common law are themselves open to revision.
For, as the common law changes, it may develop that the best theory
to justify the legal system as a whole will obviate the traditional distinctions between tort and contract, or, for that matter, between tort
and property. 00
D. Problems with Fried's Reliance on the Legal Process Conception
Fried's use of the promise principle can remedy some of the
defects of the Simple conception that bedevil his account of contract
law. Perhaps the promise principle can help us distinguish issues of
contract law from other common law concerns or aid us in evaluating
controversial new developments. By relying on the the Legal Process
conception, however, Fried raises further questions about his theory's
adequacy-questions about the various legal standards that, on the
Legal Process conception, inform contract law. For, the promise
principle is only one of several standards that have figured in contract
law. Unless Fried can explain in terms of the promise principle the
holdings and rules that have relied on other principles and policies, it
is hard to conclude that Fried's theory is superior to its rivals.
97. See J. BAKER, supra note 65, at 273-79, 329-30, 337-40.
98. See, e.g., Farnsworth, The Past of Promise:An HistoricalIntroduction to Contracts, 69

COLUM. L. REV. 576, 594-99 (1969) (acknowledging the historical force of reliance and
restitutionary principles).
99. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, 22-28, 83-84, 118-19.
100. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One

View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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PROMISING AND POLICY

As Fried conceives it, the promise principle is fundamentally
individualistic."1 A contract is the promisor's own doing, and in
making his agreement he brings liability on himself. Fried decries
what he regards as an overexpansive use of unconscionability on the
grounds that recent contract cases have voided agreements not
because of some defect in the agreement, but rather, in order to
achieve some redistribution of wealth. Whatever the merits of this
position, it belies the extent to which substantive rules of contract law
have always been a tool for wealth redistribution, in particular, and
social control, more generally.
Frequently, such control has been obscured because it has been
achieved by technical devices. A brief review of the doctrines relating
to conditions and performance can demonstrate both the social control and also the obscurity in which courts have exercised such control. A contract between A and B may call for each to render some
performance to the other. The agreement may also specify certain
conditions-events not certain to occur--on which their respective
obligations are contingent. If A's duty is unconditional then he must
perform no matter what, and failure is a breach entitling B to damages. If A's obligation is conditional, however, his performance obligation comes due and his nonperformance is actionable only if the
contingency is fulfilled or excused.
As one example of judicially exercised control over contracting,
consider the doctrine of substantialperformance: a judicially created
rule that concerns situations where the breaching party has fulfilled
the lion's share of his contractual responsibilities. 102 It is within the
parties' appropriate powers to condition each other's obligations on
some event, as they may choose. In addition, courts will commonly
construe one party's performance as a condition of the other's obligation to perform. These judicial additions to the agreed-upon terms
are called constructive (or sometimes, implied) conditions. 103 For
example, if Smith hires Jones to paint his house and they have specified nothing as to the order of their respective performances, the court
will likely deem Jones's performance as a constructive condition of
Smith's obligation to pay. Although the parties have not framed their
contract in anything like these terms, it likely will be held that Smith's
obligation to pay does not become due unless and until Jones per101. See, e.g., C. FRIED, supra note 7, at 12.
102. See, e.g., A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, at 590-96.
103. Id. at 539 & n.13.
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forms; Jones's failure to perform means that Smith is not yet obligated
to pay.
But, suppose Jones's nonperformance is by most measures insignificant. Suppose, for example, that he has used a different brand of
paint than what the contract specified, although of the same quality.
He has not complied, that is, with the strict details of the contract but
has tendered the great measure of the contracted-for performance."
If Jones's full performance is a condition for Smith's obligation to
pay, then from Jones's failure it should follow that Smith's obligation
does not come due and, further, that Smith's failure to pay is not an
actionable breach. In short, conjoining the judicial construction of
the order of performance with one party's failure to tender performance perfectly puts the other in a marvelous position: Smith would
not owe Jones a farthing on the contract even though he had the substantial benefit for which he agreed to pay.
It seems that courts developed the doctrine of substantial performance at least in part to ameliorate the harshness of this conclusion, which resulted, after all, from the courts' imposition of a
condition about the order of performance. Where one performance is
the constructive condition of the other party's performance obligation, the doctrine of substantial performance requires the nonbreaching party to complete his own performance, the breach
notwithstanding, and to seek damages for the promise-breaker's failure to live up to all his obligations. 0 5 In effect, the doctrine works to
make Jones's substantial but not necessarily perfect performance a
condition of Smith's obligation to pay. Just when the breaching
party's performance is substantial (requiring the victim to perform)
and when the breach is material (freeing the victim from performance
obligations) remains an issue for legal determination. There is no simple test; no set of determinative factors." °6
The substantial performance doctrine is only one of the doctrines
relating to performance and conditions. What is significant with
regard to Fried's thesis is this: these are constructive conditions.10 7
They create terms of the contract to which the parties have not
agreed. They result from judicially imposed rules determining which
104. The hypothetical is derived from the facts of Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y.
239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 317 (1932) (tests for materiality).
107. Fried discusses both conditions and the particular topic of substantial performance.
See C. FRIED, supra note 7, at 112-32. But his analysis does not acknowledge the status of
some conditions as constructive. Instead, he attempts to reconstruct their role in contract law
as the result of a complex interplay of the promissory and the restitutionary principle.
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party has what performance obligations and seem to be imposed for
reasons of social control. In some situations, they prevent unjust forfeitures, depending on the courts' perceptions of justice in the parties'
respective positions. 0 8 In other cases they serve as a protection for
certain kinds of parties, °9 and thus provide an incentive for certain
activities. They serve, generally speaking, to readjust the risks and
burdens that the parties must bear in the event that the contract cannot be fully performed. Because the parties' risks determine their bargaining positions, these rules can serve to shift economic positions and
ultimately wealth."' 0
A brief review of the history of constructive conditions shows
that courts have frequently used these doctrines in ways that would
serve plainly redistributive goals.1 1 ' In the nineteenth century, for
example, courts characteristically deemed employment contracts as
"entire": if the employee had contracted to work for, say, a year, then
any performance short of a full year was a breach, and the employee
could not recover for wages for the part of the year he had completed.
Complete performance was a condition for any obligation on the
employer to pay wages.' 1 2 Ultimately, legislative correction was
required to protect the worker. For building contracts, on the other
hand, the doctrine of substantial performance protected the builder
against any forfeiture, and even if he had failed to perform substantially, the contractor could recover for restitution of the value he had
given to the buyer by part performance. 113
Observing how courts have tailored rules like substantial performance to different kinds of contracts makes it plain that judges
have long felt free to shape doctrine in order to promote social policies. It is hard to view such discrepant judicial treatment without
attributing economic or political rationales to the decisions. In short,
there are policies that courts have recognized as important in contract
law and that judges have used to justify their decisions. But, these
policies run counter to the promise principle, at least as Fried understands and expounds it.
2.

ONE PRINCIPLE AMONG OTHERS

Two other principles could be said to compete with the- promise
108. See, e.g., Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921).
109. For an early analysis of this function of constructive conditions, see Patterson,
Constructive Conditions in Contract, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 919-20 (1942).
110. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 472-75 (1980).
111. See, M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 186-88 (1977).
112. Id. at 186.
113. Id. at 187.
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principle for explanatory force in contract law. One of these is the
reliance principle: when A justifiably relies to his detriment on the
actions or statements of B, then A can in a proper case recover from B
to the extent of his reliance on B's actions or statements. The reliance
principle lies at the heart of the development of promissory estoppel.
Another principle is that of benefit, or restitution. Suppose Smith
delivers to Jones's house coal that was supposed to be delivered to
Jones's neighbor's house instead. If Jones uses the coal, then Smith
can recover from Jones the value of the benefit Jones unjustifiably
obtained. In legal parlance, Jones will be forced to disgorge the extent
of his enrichment, restoring it (or its value) to Smith. Some recoveries
that are justified by reference to the principle of restitution are styled
quasi-contract."1 4 Restitution and reliance have long and venerable
pedigrees in the common law. We can point to their importance in
early common law mechanisms for handling problems of promissory
liability.
The issue remains in some doubt, but contract as we now understand it seems to be a relatively new enterprise within the history of
the common law. "5 Our modem form of contract seems to have
emerged from the writ of assumpsit-that is, from a branch of the
common law that, looking backwards from our current viewpoint, we
would style tort. In the writ system of the common law, an action of
assumpsit would lie for one's failure to do as one should when one
had assumed a special obligation. One might assume such an obligation by making a promise, but one might also assume the obligation in
virtue of one's profession or "calling." In short, while assumpsit
included something of our modem promissory liability, it was fundamentally delictual in nature. In assumpsit's earlier incarnations one
was liable if one had promised to do something and then harmed the
promisee by a negligent performance. To move from liability for misfeasance to a more recognizable form of liability just because one had
promised and then failed to carry out one's promise required several
generations of sly lawyering.
In the system of writs, what had preceded contract was not one
but two actions-debt and covenant. To gloss over many of the subtleties, the action of debt seems to have been primarily proprietary in
nature." 6 As it developed, I could sue in debt to recover a specified
amount of money but not for generalized damages. To sustain my
114. See A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, at 98-100.

115. For a concise and readable summary of the historical progression from the various
writs to a unified law of contracts in England, see J. BAKER, supra note 65, at 273-90.
116. Id. at 266-71.
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suit I could allege that I had given a quid pro quo-I gave you something of value, which entitled me to the sum of money that you had
undertaken to pay. You are no longer entitled to that sum, for a right
to it passed to me when you accepted the quid pro quo that I gave
you. So, I may properly demand that you give back to me that which
I now (in virtue of our transaction) own. Conversely, if you do not
tender the money, I am warranted in recovering the specific goods
that I gave to you by way of a quid pro quo. Covenant, on the other
hand, was in many superficial respects much more like contract. 117 It
was an action to enforce a promise, although the action was limited to
promises that had certain attributes. If you had put your promise in
writing and then sealed the writing, I could sue to enforce the sealed
promise. Characteristically, I could not enforce the promise unless it
was sealed.
This history suggests that the reliance and restitutionary principles should be accorded at least as important a place in contract's
pantheon as should the promise principle. Promise-keeping was recognized, but not as an all embracing basis for obligation; the bald
promise was enforceable in covenant only if it met the formal requisites. A promise to pay money was enforceable in debt if something of
value had been given to support the claim; debt, in short, looks to
have been founded as much on restitutionary notions as on the force
of promise-keeping. Promise-keeping seems to have been recognized
as much in tort as in anything that looked like contract. And, even
assumpsit's historical force seems to have been the reliance principle:
you were liable for the damage caused by someone's relying on your
undertaking, but your undertaking could be either a promise or a special occupation or calling. As a matter of history, the promise principle does not seem to explain these various sources for our modem law
of contract.
VI.

THE LAW TODAY AND THE LAW TO COME

A.

The Teleological Conception of Law

Fried's account is not fully compatible with either the Simple or
the Legal Process conception of law, although he relies on both in his
argument. There are errant cases and unreconciled rules that undercut his reliance on the Simple conception. And, there are principles
and policies at work in contract law that defy attempts to reduce them
to the moral principle of promise-keeping.
There is, however, another argument that Fried might want to
117. Id. at 264-66, 273-82.
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make. This argument depends on a Teleological conception of an
adequate theory of law. We understand, Fried could urge, that the
common law changes over time, that its authorities and standards
may evolve. Recognizing a general process of change in the common
law, we might perceive contract law as developing in a way that could
lead us to a version of contract law different from what we now have.
In the course of this development, extraneous or foreign elements can
be sloughed off, new distinctions drawn, and new categories recognized. If this process of change were sufficiently long or vigorous,
then a different law of contracts might be revealed as the ultimate
result. In particular, Fried might argue, we should expect that contract law will develop along lines that will ultimately reveal the promise principle as the foundation of contract law.
If one held such a teleological or developmental view of the
changes in contract law, then one's criteria for an adequate theory of
contract should reflect that view. A theory of law should explain
more than just the current state of the law-a state that might, in the
long range development of the law, prove merely transitional. An
adequate theory must also account for the process of legal development and, ultimately, the end product of that development. That is, if
contract law does develop in some teleological manner, then an adequate theory should account for what contract law will become.
Lawyers and legal scholars have been attracted to teleological
claims about the law.II 8 Scholars of contract law, in particular, have
been drawn to teleology. Henry Maine was perhaps the most notable,
when he pronounced that the development of civilized societies has
been "a movement from Status to Contract," ' 19 but others have been
no less willing to read some progression of society into the develop118. For a review of the various ways in which American legal scholars have appealed to
teleological theories, see Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence,85 COLUM. L.
REV. 38 (1985). The seminal figure in American legal theory's discussion of legal evolution is
surely Holmes. See id. at 51-55; Vetter, The Evolution of Holmes, Holmes and Evolution, 72
CALIF. L. REV. 343 (1984). For a reprise of the impact of the idea of evolution on English
legal thought, see P. STEINER, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA (1980). Herbert
Hovenkamp has advanced a more involved analysis of the idea of evolution and its role in legal
theory, criticizing Elliot and others for failing to distinguish evolutionary models, properly so
called, from developmental models more generally. See Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in
Jurisprudence,64 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1985). Precision of thought also requires distinguishing
between the Teleological conception and evolutionary or other developmental ideas. Teleology
implies development and is consistent with any of a variety of developmental mechanisms.
What is distinctive about teleology, however, is its idea of development because of or toward
some identified goal, value, purpose or final point.
119. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 170 (4th ed. 1870).
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ment of a system of contract law.' 2° To some extent, at least, this can

be explained by the fact that lawyers are confronted with clear
instances of change in legal doctrine. It is common to remark on the
development of a new rule, or the new extension of an old one. Conversely, we may trace legal language, procedures, and doctrines back
to their points of origin and contrast the beginning point with the
current state of affairs.
What we have seen of contract's history tends to confirm this.
Contract seems to have emerged, as suggested above, 121 from an earlier congerie of writs, no one of which served the earlier English legal
system in the same way that contract serves our current system. Doctrines, it should be noted, have also developed. Consideration seems
to have grown out of an amalgam of the different procedural antecedents of contract.122 Promissory estoppel can be seen as a response to
the inadequacies of a rigid application of the consideration requirement. 123 Constructive conditions became favored by courts as a way
of organizing and regulating contract behavior, but constructive conditions, in turn, required ameliorating doctrines like substantial
performance. 124
Lawyers and judges expect that the common law will be
dynamic: its doctrines will change to meet new social situations. We
can trace changes in the development of contract law leading up to its
present state and anticipate that it will continue to change from the
present on. If we conceive of the law of contracts as fundamentally
adaptive, then we should expect that an adequate theory of the law of
contracts must allow for change and should articulate the dimensions
along which change will likely occur. The legal community's stock in
trade further includes the notion that aspects of our legal system may
be evaluated as being appropriate or inappropriate for the times. Not
only do lawyers attend to the timeliness of some rule or institution,
they are also attracted to the idea that what is now at hand is in some
way better than what we had before, that the course of legal change
has been good and that the last stages in that development are better
than the earlier points. It is not at all unusual for lawyers and legal
scholars to characterize a rule as archaic, a procedural form or limitation as anachronistic. In general, legal scholars are quite shameless
in talking about the "genius" or "wisdom" of the common law,
120. See, e.g., F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS:
35 (1970).
121. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., J. BAKER, supra note 65, at 271-93.
123. G. GILMORE, supra note 32, at 60-66.
124. A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, at 576-96.
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reflecting a belief in its adaptive qualities. 25
B.

Fried'sReliance on the Teleological Conception

Fried does not state that he has a teleological vision of contract
law, but he commits himself in Contractas Promise to the corresponding view about the nature of an adequate theory of contract. On one
occasion, he claims explicitly that the law of contracts is moving
toward a particular state in which the morality of promise-keeping
will play a more direct role in judicial decisions. He asserts that contract law's movement "suggests that we may have in the not too dis-

tant future a more candid set of principles to determine which
promises should be enforceable in terms of the fairness of each
type."' 126 Moreover, two features of Fried's writings indicate that the
quoted passage was not merely a chance remark. First, certain salient
elements of Fried's treatment of contract remedies indicate a Teleological conception of contract law. Second, in another essay Fried has
argued for something very much like a teleological view of the common law.127 These features indicate that Fried's theory can be understood as an effort to explain how contract law will develop and what it
will become. More particularly, if Fried relies on a Teleological con125. See, e.g., Chief Justice Shaw's ringing prose in his opinion for the court in Norway
Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine R.R.:
It is one of the great merits and advantages of the common law, that, instead
of a series of detailed practical rules, established by positive provision, and
adapted to the precise circumstances of particular cases, which would become
obsolete and fail, when the practice and course of business, to which they apply,
should cease or change, the common law consists of a few broad and
comprehensive principles, founded on reason, natural justice, and enlightened
public policy, modified and adapted to the circumstances of all the particular
cases which fall within it ....

Another consequence of this expansive character of the common law is, that
when new practices spring up, new combinations of facts arise, and cases are
presented for which there is no precedent in judicial decision, they must be
governed by the general principle, applicable to cases most nearly analogous, but
modified and adapted to new circumstances, by considerations of fitness and
propriety, of reason and justice, which grow out of those circumstances. The
consequence of this state of law is, that when a new practice or new course of
business arises, the rights and duties of parties are not without a law to govern
them; the general considerations of reason, justice and policy, which underlie the
particular rules of the common law, will still apply, modified and adapted, by the
same considerations, to the new circumstances.
67 Mass. (1 Gray) 263, 267-68 (1854).
126. C. FRIED, supra note 7, at 39. Fried points, in the same passage, to two forces which
drive that "movement:" First, decisions and statutes that lend "validity to types of promises
whose legitimacy had been in doubt under the doctrine of consideration." Id. And second, "a
more open willingness to stigmatize certain promises as unfair or unconscionable and to deny
enforcement on that ground rather than on the ground of insufficient consideration." Id.
127. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:925

ception of contract law, then we would understand his claim along the
following lines: The promise principle explains the future development of contract law, and the form which contract law will come to
have will reflect the promise principle as contract's moral foundation.
1.

THE PURITY OF REMEDIES

If Fried's theory depends on a Teleological conception of contract law then we should find, lurking in his treatment, appeal to some
notion of a "true" structure of contract law, which will emerge
through some sequence of developments. There is substantial evidence from his treatment of contract remedies that Fried has an argument of this teleological sort in mind.
Consider the emergence of promissory estoppel, perhaps this century's most significant development bearing on the scope of contractual liability. From its initial application to gift promises it now
provides a recovery for parties who would otherwise be frustrated by
various formal requirements or doctrinal technicalities. Thus,
expanded use of promissory estoppel poses a challenge for the contract theorist-either one acknowledges the doctrine as a significant
addition to our law of contracts, such that an adequate theory must
include it, or one rejects it as an unacceptable growth, a malignancy
to be excised, or at least contained. Fried rejects the doctrine. If its
effect is to make enforceable a promise, properly so called, then it is in
accord with Fried's view of the obligation to keep one's promises. But
where detrimental reliance is thought to warrant recovery for unaccepted offers, or other commitments that are not true promises, promissory estoppel is improper.
As measured by prevailing opinion, Fried's position is plainly
unorthodox. The Restatement (Second), for example, states that a
promise made enforceable by the promisee's detrimental reliance is a
contract. 28 But Fried's argument is not entirely without foundation.
Recent developments have cast the prevailing acceptance of promissory estoppel into doubt. First, in a notable case the court relied in its
decision on a distinction between enforcing a contract and enforcing a
promise under promissory estoppel.1 29 The parties were still in the
process of negotiating their final agreement, and the plaintiff relied to
his detriment on the promises of defendant's agents that a deal was
forthcoming. If there had to be a contract for the plaintiff to recover,
his action would have failed. But, the court instead gave a remedy for
the breach of various promises that had been made by the defendant
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 comment e (1979).
129. See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
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during the negotiation process. Fried makes much of the court's distinction between an action for a broken contract and one for promises
wrongfully broken to support his claim that contract's foundation is
the promise principle and not reliance. 3 '
Further, in recent approaches to the question of remedies, there
is at least some evidence that a similar distinction is being made
between providing a remedy for a breach of contract and giving a
recovery for the breach of a promise under promissory estoppel.
Fried makes much of the standard remedy for breach of contract. In
articulating his view of contracts, he asserts:
If I make a promise to you, I should do as I promise; and if I
fail to keep my promise it is fair that I should be made to hand
over the equivalent of the promised performance. In contract doctrine this proposition appears as the expectation measure of damages for breach.' 31
In an action for breach of contract the standard measure of damages
is, as Fried notes, what is called the expectation interest. 132 Sometimes also termed the "benefit of the bargain," this is the amount necessary to put the injured party in as good a position as he would have
been if both parties had completed their performance under the
contract. 133
We may contrast the expectation interest with two other measures of the injured party's damages: the reliance and the restitution
interests. Awarding the injured party his reliance interest as a measure of his damages would give him the amount he was out of pocket
in reliance on the breaching party's promise; awarding him his restitution interest would pay him back for the benefit he had conveyed to
the breaching party before performance came to a halt.' 34 In a contract action where the injured party's expectation cannot be calculated with any reasonable certainty, the reliance or restitutionary
interest might be used as an alternative measure of damages.
Apparently Fried feels that there is some norm of fairness relating to promise-keeping that would compel awarding the expectation
measure of damages for breach of promise. He does not, in Contract
as Promise, attempt to articulate either the nature or the source of
that norm. But, whatever it might be, the alleged primacy of this
norm of fairness is challenged by developments in promissory estop130. C.

FRIED,

supra note 7, at 21-27.

131. Id. at 105.
132. Id.
133. See A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 35, at 839.
134. Id. at 839, 904-14.
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pel. There, the trend is to limit recovery to the extent of the injured
party's reliance. In its early development, courts characteristically
awarded the disappointed promisee her full expectation on a suit for
promissory estoppel.13 1 More recent courts, however, have been
reluctant to award the full value of the promise when the reliance is
considerably less. Instead, courts have been satisfied to limit the
1 36
promisor's liability to the extent of the promisee's actual detriment.
The same Restatement (Second) which claims that promises enforced
are, indeed, contracts has also enshrined this modern trend regarding
remedies: "The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice
requires." 37
In short, the expectation measure, while normal for damages on
the contract, is not the universal remedy for the breach of a reliedupon promise. The recent trends regarding promissory estoppel can
be read as establishing a reliance measure of damages for that claim
instead of an expectation measure. Fried claims that the expectation
interest is the fair and appropriate remedy for a breach of contract. If
the appropriate measure of damages for detrimental reliance is something other than the expectation interest, that might show, in Fried's
view, that promissory estoppel is no part of contract properly so
called. Similarly, a trend in the law away from using the expectation
interest as the measure of damages for promissory estoppel would
indicate that contract is moving to purge itself of elements that are
not properly part of contract.
So perhaps Fried could argue that these developments in the law
indicate that contract law is evolving towards a purer vision. This
purer vision relegates promissory estoppel to its proper place and
keeps contract law, the argument might run, to that which is consistent with the promise principle.
2.

THE CUNNING OF REASON

In Contract as Promise, Fried does not frame his argument for
the promise principle in anything like the teleological or developmental form sketched above. He only hints, in his discussion of remedies,
at the idea that contract law is ridding itself of foreign elements. In
another place, however, he has advanced a claim about the nature of
legal change and development which, when joined with his argument
that the promise principle is the moral foundation of contract law,
135. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898).
136. See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1966).
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
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leads to the claim that contract law is developing towards a purer
form.
Fried has argued1 3 1 that law is "a moral science" and that in
determining the law, judges decide as moral agents.1 39 That judges
are moral agents means, for Fried, that they respond to moral arguments and that one way to get a judge to make a particular decision is
to make that decision the correct conclusion for a moral argument. 14
From this characterization of law as a moral science and judges as
moral agents it follows, he claims, that
an understanding of correct moral arguments provides for understanding why the common law-that is, the system of decisions by
common law judges-is what it is. It also provides an understanding of why the common law changes. For though we may agree
that moral arguments themselves do not change-that is, an argument is not correct at one time and incorrect at another-the circumstances to which an argument applies change, and the
combination of correct arguments and changed circumstances will
provide an account of changing conclusions, of change and devel-

opment in the common law. 141

We can recast Fried's argument along the following lines. Let us suppose that there are such things as correct moral arguments. Let us
further suppose that advancing a correct moral argument to a judge
with respect to a particular legal controversy will incline the judge to
decide the case in accordance with the conclusion of that moral argument. If there are moral norms at work in the law, then we should
expect judges to decide cases in accordance with these norms. Moreover, as decisions are made, they become precedents for making similar decisions in similar cases. It follows that we should expect a
general tendency both toward common law decisions that are morally
correct and toward a common law that accords with moral norms.
The development of the common law, in sum, should be a development towards a moral law.
Fried's claim about the force of moral arguments in the common
law bears on his theory of contract law because he also contends that
the foundation of contract is our moral obligation to keep our
promises.142 A valid argument that a contract should be enforced
because of the promise principle will be, on Fried's view, a correct
138. Fried, The Law of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral and Legal History, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 335 (1980).

139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 336.
Id. at 336-39.
Id. at 338.
See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
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moral argument. Other things being equal, that should lead the
judge as a moral agent to enforce the contract. More particularly,
using the expectation interest as the measure of damages caused by a
breach is also the conclusion of a correct moral argument, and its
moral status should incline the judge to that remedy. We should
expect, therefore, that common law judges will always be inclined, as
moral agents, to enforce contracts and to award the benefit of the
bargain as a remedy. So, other things being equal, the moral correctness of holding promisors to their promises should be a force of
change in contract law. In sum, we should expect that contract law
will change over time and become more moral. And, because Fried
views the moral force of contract law as the moral obligation to keep
one's promises, we should expect that contract law will change over
time by becoming more purely the enforcement of promises.
C. Assessing the Teleological Conception
It is at least arguable that the legal community's predilection
toward a Teleological conception of legal change is fundamentally
based on superstition. Dr. Pangloss, after all, has made us skeptical of
teleological claims.' 43 Moreover, we may note certain egregious deficiencies in teleological claims as they are commonly advanced to justify some contention about politics or history.
To claim that some societal institution is developing towards a
particular end state invites skepticism on several grounds. 144 We
wonder, first, why the proponent of the teleological claim has identified that specific end state as the developmental terminus. In particular, we wonder whether there is a disguised element of advocacy
lurking about in that identification-perhaps the teleological claim is
less description than exhortation. We are troubled, moreover, about
the kind of causal mechanism that is supposed to be leading the institution in question toward that specific end state. Finally, even if there
are some indications that the institution is in some respects closer to
its terminus than it was previously, we might also question if there are
not other respects in which the institution is further distanced from its
purported goal. The teleological proponent must show not only that
some causal factor is leading the institution toward the alleged end,
but also that other factors are not simultaneously leading the institution away from the specific end that has been asserted. Perhaps the
overall drift is toward another resolution instead.
143. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE AND OTHER WRITINGS (H. Block ed. 1956).
144. For a comparable analysis of the merits of teleological claims, see E.
note 15.

NAGEL,
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There are ample grounds, in short, on which to distrust teleological claims about legal development and, more particularly, about
development in contract law. Nonetheless, some reflection on our
expectations relating to the judicial process will give us pause, at the
least, before we can dismiss all teleological claims about the common
law. The various bases on which the legal community evaluates judicial decisionmaking lend some support to a teleological vision of common law development.
Judges have an obligation to decide cases and to decide them
according to law.145 The legal community also expects judges to justify the decisions they reach by reference to the various legal authorities that are applicable and relevant. We expect that courts will
generally adhere to past decisions and that the common law will generally provide for continuity and stability of doctrine. Hence, our
obligations of precedent: courts will stand by their own prior decisions; lower courts will follow the authority of the highest court of the
jurisdiction; like cases will be treated alike at every level of hierarchy.
In problematic cases, where the rule embodied in some line of cases is
hard to discern or uncertain as to its implications for the case at hand,
we might expect that judges will appeal to principles and policies of
the law.I46 These legal standards serve to explain and rationalize the
past decisions and to aid the court in clarifying or extending the
existing law. For, even when the authoritative cases are uncertain or
indeterminate, a court can remain faithful to the demands of reasoned
decision-making in a precedential system by following the principles
or policies that inform those past decisions.
Courts will generally adhere to existing cases and rules. But we
also expect that the common law will change over time and across
different circumstances. 47 We expect that judges will participate in
this process of change. Moreover, as judicial decisions work changes
in the law we expect that judges will justify their decisions in much
the same manner and by reference to the same general sources and
warrants as are used by courts to justify a decision according to precedent. 4 ' Most significantly, we expect that courts will rely on standards of the law to justify not only the extension of a rule to a new
situation, but also the employment of a rule where none had previously existed and even the substitution of a new rule for an old. So, it
is part of the legal community's understanding of the judicial process
145. See generally LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 21; N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING
(1978).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 75-82.
147. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 91, at 3-4.
148. See, e.g., H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 77; N. MACCORMICK, supra note 145.
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that courts will properly act in various ways to effect change in the
law and that they will rely on legal standards to justify their actions.
Generally, we expect that this process of legal development will occur
not by any great sea change, but, rather, incrementally and slowly.
But we expect that the law will indeed develop.
Given this picture of the judicial process, it is easy to understand
how some might view the process as leading, over time, to a teleological development of the common law. For, the standards of the law on
which courts will rely in this development can be seen as expressions
of values at work in the legal system.149 By expecting judges to rely
on these legal standards in their development of the law, we impose
on judges an obligation to further these values. That is, the judicial
process itself seems to involve courts in an effort to ensure the place of
these legal values. So, we would expect that over time the judicial
development of the common law will be a development toward the
greater exemplification of the system's values. In short, at an abstract
and quite general level, the judicial process, as it is commonly understood by the legal community, suggests a teleological perspective on
legal change.
This abstract and general description of legal development
obscures a number of complications. First, this description of the
judicial process presupposes that the set of legal standards is relatively
stable over time. Only if the same set of principles and policies that
guide judges at the beginning of the development process also guide
courts at its end can we expect that the overall process will further
those values that are embodied in the law's standards. If the set of
standards changed significantly from one judicial era to the next, then
the most that could be said of any change in the law is that it furthers
some particular set of values. The next change, although perhaps furthering some set of standards, might not necessarily further the same
set as the previous change. Thus, although we could observe legal
change, we might not achieve legal development toward some end
result.
Second, the description of legal development in terms of the judicial process supposes that the set of legal authorities and standards is
coherent in some important sense. In other words, this account of
legal change supposes that the standards of the legal system are not in
serious conflict. For, even if some legal change favors one value, it
remains possible that another change will further another, inconsis149. It is important to note that, by pointing to values at work in the legal system, one is not
necessarily claiming that the legal system is fundamentally moral, nor that law and morality
are necessarily intertwined.
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tent value. Overall, then, there might be substantial change in the
legal system without any actual progress toward some resolution of
the conflict; change without true teleology.
Moreover, we understand that the judicial process of developing
the law is only one aspect of legal development. Legislative enactments might well change the set of standards operative in the law. It
is common to observe some statute or other that states as its purpose
the changing of the common law. And statutes, as they are interpreted by courts, are routinely treated as reflecting at least a policy
that the legislature favors, if not also a principle. Thus, the possibility
of enactments means that the set of standards may change over time,
and further, that the standards of the law gain or lose coherence.
It is beyond the scope of this article to consider whether, when
all is said and done, a Teleological conception of the common law of
contracts is tenable. For my purposes, it is enough to note that Teleological conceptions have been attractive to theorists of the common
law, and that the legal community's expectations of the judicial process provide fertile ground in which a teleological view might take
root. As a result of our understanding of the judicial process, we
expect that where we are now in the law of contracts owes its character to where we have come from, and we expect that where we will be
a generation or two from now will continue to show the influence of
past generations. We suspect that the history of contract law will
continue to exercise substantial influence over the future development
of contract law.
D. Problems with Fried's Reliance on the Teleological Conception
Even understood as a teleological claim about contract law development, Fried's promise-based theory is open to challenge. There are
good grounds to doubt any claim that the moral obligation to keep
our promises can explain the future developments of contract.
A number of grounds were identified above on which one might
well feel skepticism about a claim that legal change is, in fact, a matter of teleology. 150 We might wonder about the proponent's identification of the particular end of the legal development; we might doubt
the causal mechanism that is supposed to lead us to the end result;
and we might question whether, on closer inspection, the drift in the
law really is toward the supposed terminus. In particular, on this last
ground for skepticism, we might ask if there are not other factors that
are leading the law of contracts away from a law based on promise150. See supra text accompanying notes 144-45.
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keeping. Fried has undertaken to satisfy our doubts on the first two
counts. Contractas Promise aims to identify the moral force of promise-keeping in contract law. Fried's essay on legal change provides us
with the causal mechanism by which contract law might be said to
develop towards a unified structure based on promise-keeping.
Recent developments in contract remedies, however, undermine
the claim that contract law really is progressing toward an end result
in which the promise principle reigns supreme. Fried appears to rely
on the suggestion, considered above, that developments in remedies
are evidence that promissory estoppel will ultimately be weeded out of
contract law. But, promissory estoppel is not the only aspect of contract law where a trend in remedies can be observed. A similar trend
can be observed in a line of cases concerning promises made enforceable because of "moral consideration."''
It can be seen that for these
cases, as for promissory estoppel, the trend is toward using a different
measure of damages than the expectation interest. This trend calls
into question Fried's suggestions about the emerging primacy of the
expectation interest as the measure of damages, and, hence his contention that promissory estoppel should be exiled from the realm of
contract law.
Consider the following situation:
A married woman renders household services without compensation over a period of years for B, a man of eighty living alone and
having no close relatives. B has a substantial net worth. Well after
the woman stopped providing the household services, B assures
her-in all seriousness and on several distinct occasions-that she
would be well compensated for the services. The reasonable value
of her services is not in excess of $6000. 152
Under the bargain theory of consideration, B's promise is not
enforceable: because B made his promise well after the woman rendered the services, the services did not induce the promise, and hence
the parties did not bargain for the promise.
Two important lines of cases, however, have spawned an alternative rule that would hold B (or his estate) liable for his promise even
though traditional doctrine would have found nothing like consideration. One line of relatively common cases is applicable when the services rendered to B are life- or health-saving. B is said to have incurred
a moral obligation to repay his benefactor for any injury suffered by
151. See supra text accompanying note 49. See generally A.

FARNSWORTH,

supra note 35,

at 52-59.
152. The example is taken from In Re Hatten's Estate, 233 Wis. 199, 288 N.W. 278 (1940).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 comment i, illustration 12 (1979).
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the good samaritan in saving B, and that obligation will make
enforceable B's promise.153 Another trend, limited initially to Wisconsin, found a moral obligation even when the services rendered
were mundane and less dramatic than saving B's life. 154 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has followed Wisconsin's lead, although
eschewing talk of moral consideration, and would make B's promise
enforceable. 155
Fried has rejected the bargain theory of consideration as incoherent and has urged that promises, even if gratuitous, be enforced.
Moreover, he explicitly approved the line of cases where B's promise
is given for life- or health-saving services. 156 So, it would seem that he
would be committed to enforcing B's promise. These cases, however,
challenge the primacy of the expectation interest as the proper measure of damages. Therefore, they undercut any argument that Fried
might make that the promise principle is ascendant.
Let us suppose that the woman's services are worth not more
than $6,000. If B promises to pay her $25,000, the consensus of Wisconsin and the Restatement (Second) is to enforce B's promise, giving
the woman her expectation interest. But, if B promises (with equal
seriousness and before witnesses) to give her his entire estate, where
his estate is worth a few million, then the Restatement (Second)
would give her only the reasonable value of her services, i.e., only
$6,000.157 In a procedurally complicated case the Wisconsin court
reached essentially the same result.15 What is significant about this
development is precisely that the damages awarded were not based on
her expectation interest. Her award was limited, instead, to the reasonable value of the services she gave to B, plausibly a restitutionary
measure instead.
In other words, here is a legal development in which the development of the promise principle seems thwarted: its alleged corollary,
the expectation measure of damages has been rejected by courts even
153. See, e.g., Webb v. McGowin, 27 Ala. App. 82, 168 So. 196 (1935), cert. denied, 232
Ala. 374, 168 So. 199 (1936); see also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 116 (1937).
154. See, e.g., In Re Hatten's Estate, 233 Wis. 199, 288 N.W. 278 (1940) (promisee
provided housekeeping services).
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1979).
156. C. FRIED, supra note 7, at 32-33.
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 comment i, illustration 13 (1979).
158. See In re Gerke's Estate, 271 Wis. 297, 73 N.W.2d 506 (1955). The court in Gerke
held that moral consideration made the promise enforceable but further reasoned that a

promise to pay out the entire estate had to meet the requirements of a valid will. Finding that
the promise in question did not meet those requirements, the court awarded the reasonable
value of the promisee's services on a theory of quantum meruit, or implied contract for
services.
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as they expand the enforcement of promises beyond the confines of

the traditional consideration requirement. B's promise is enforced on
its terms only if the value of B's promise is not disproportionate to the
value of the services rendered; otherwise, the enforcement may be limited to the reasonable value of the services. In short, in this line of
cases the restitutionary principle seems ascendant and the promise
principle denied. Even were we to view contract law in the full scope
of possible legal developments, it does not appear that the promise
principle can explain the full range of contract law.
VII.

AN ADEQUATE THEORY OF THE COMMON LAW

Lawyers who have theorized about the common law's various
parts have not generally pursued the question, "What is the law of

contracts?" "Or of torts?" "Or of whatever subdivision they are
exploring?" Perhaps as a result, they have also failed to attend to
important differences among the various conceptions of the common
law. I have argued that the three conceptions on which Fried relies
each generate different criteria for an adequate theory of contract
law.159 To some extent at least, Fried's argument trades on these
differences.
It is the Simple conception that renders initially plausible Fried's
hypothesis that contract's structure can be related in some insightful
way to promise-keeping, a moral institution. For, that conception
supports two assumptions that are important to Fried's argument:
first, that we can take at face value the references to promise-keeping
that adorn judges' opinions and, second, that the law of contracts,
which is to be related to the promise principle, is a relatively stable
and well-agreed upon enterprise. To take seriously judicial references
to promise-keeping also commits the theorist, on pain of inconsistency, to take seriously the other doctrines and authorities of contract
law to which judges also recur. Some of these, however, cannot be
squared with the promise principle. To reconcile this discrepancy
between the promise principle and the law as identified by the Simple
conception Fried must therefore appeal to a more elaborate conception of the law of contracts than is provided by the Simple conception
alone.
His argument indicates that Fried relies on both the Legal Process conception, with its structure of principles and policies, and a
Teleological conception with its projection of a law of promise-keeping as the end point of contract's development. Recourse to either of
159. See supra text accompanying notes 34-41 (the Simple conception), notes 75-82 (the
Legal Process conception), & notes 118-25 (the Teleological conception).
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these conceptions, however, burdens Fried with a further requirement: he must demonstrate the primacy of the promise principle over
other values at work in contract's development, if he is to contend
that contract law is based on, or will ultimately be based on, the moral
obligation of promise-keeping. An examination of contract's history
and current trends indicates that the promise principle is not the only
value at work in contract law. Further, those trends do not demonstrate that promise-keeping is, in any relevant sense, the dominant
value at work in contract's development. Finally, examining certain
trends in the area of damages leads to skepticism about Fried's claim
that promise-keeping is emergent as the dominant force in contract
law.
Fried's argument, as it has been developed, lacks force because
he has failed to take account of the differing characteristics of contract law that would be required to ground an adequate theory under
each of the different conceptions to which he appeals. This essay is
not the place to articulate and defend a complete set of criteria for an
adequate theory of contract law, but Fried's failures suggest a few
rough and ready generalizations about what constrains any adequate
account of the common law or of its parts.
First, an adequate account should reflect the importance of history. The current state of contract law will likely reflect not just the
workings of some principle or set of principles, nor just the current set
of judgments about questions of policy. Rather, we should expect that
contract's present set of authorities will be drawn from contract's previous developments. History seems inescapable in a precedential system of law: current controversies should be decided by reference,
among other things, to the way in which past controversies were
decided. This suggests that any ahistorical account of the common
law will be prone to difficulties.
Second, a theory of the common law should acknowledge the
prospect of judicial willfulness. Judges are sometimes led to decide
cases and even to create doctrine on the strength of their perceptions
of fairness. Just what grounds their perceptions of fairness is uncertain, but those perceptions are likely to draw on a number of
sources-principles and policies already at work in the law, moral
sentiments, perhaps even class prejudices. Sometimes, a number of
judges will strive toward the same result, without being aware of other
similar decisions. On occasion, one salient case will precipitate other
decisions. As a result, any theory that attempts to reduce developments in a part of the common law to the impetus of a single operative norm seems likely to be undermined. In deciding contract cases,
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judges may well respond to the force of promise-keeping, but it
appears that they respond to other norms as well.
Third, an adequate theory of some part of the common law
should accommodate the interplay between substantive and remedial
law. It is sometimes urged that the two are necessarily equivalent,
that there can be no remedy where there is no substantive right and,
16
further, that there can be no more remedy than the right entails. 0
Fried relies on a fundamental connection between the promise principle and the expectation measure of damages. At any point in contract's development, it may be possible to reconceptualize the existing
set of rights and remedies so that some such equivalence is exhibited.
But in general this possibility belies the myriad ways in which courts
can expand and refine legal remedies without strict attention to the
substantive rights which might be supposed to ground those remedies.
Moreover, not only can judges expand remedies while appearing to
presuppose the existing set of substantive rights, those remedies, once
expanded, can provide a spur to further development of the rights. In
contract, the development of promissory estoppel and of moral consideration has, at times, exhibited this kind of dynamism. Fried's
account founders, on occasion, because he is prepared to assume
uncritically the definitional connection between contract and the
expectation measure of damages for breach. But contract's history is
rife with examples of remedial developments that have exceeded the
scope and limit of the promise principle. Any theory of contract law
that does not accommodate the prospect that substantive and remedial developments in the law can follow independent paths seems
likely to overlook crucial developments in the law.
These generalizations should bear on our evaluation of any theory of the common law or its parts. They are particularly forceful
when we consider a theory such as Fried's account of contract
because his account depends on a single moral principle. His ambition
runs beyond the task, difficult enough, of providing a moral account
of contract law; he aims to explain contract in terms of just one moral
principle, the obligation to keep our promises. Contract's history, its
common law development by judges, and the interaction between its
rights and its remedies make it all the less likely that one and only one
principle should explain the full variety of its developments.

160. See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).

